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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS AND
THE OPPORTUNISTIC PURSUIT OF TREBLE
DAMAGES
Henry N. Butler*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants private parties the right to recover
treble damages resulting from an antitrust violation. ' The economic goal
of the treble damage award is to deter antitrust violations through increas-
ing both the probability of enforcement by rewarding private actions and
the cost of getting caught. 2 Legal commentators, as well as economists,
continue to debate the efficacy of the treble damage action as a means of
promoting consumer welfare. 3
It is clear that the threat of treble damage actions tends to deter all types
of potential antitrust violations. The problem is that some of the behavior
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I thank Barry D. Baysinger, Kenneth A. Bums, and Asghar Zardkoohi for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. As usual, remaining errors are the author's responsibility.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4 of the Clayton Act superceded § 7 of the Sherman Act, ch.
647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
2. The Supreme Court has emphasized the deterrence effects of the private action. Perma-Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) ("[T]he purposes of the anti-
trust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever present threat to deter
anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws."); Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (discussing the role of "private attorneys general" in augmenting
public enforcement). See also Blair, Antitrust Penalties: Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH
L. REV. 57; Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of
Fines, 69 AM. EcoN. REv. 880 (1979). The goals of § 4 may also be stated as compensation and
punishment, which are merely ex post manifestations of the goal of ex ante deterrence. For an empiri-
cal analysis of the effectiveness of treble damage actions in deterring horizontal price fixing, see
Block, Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect ofAntitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429 (1981).
The recent policy debate over the use of contribution in antitrust necessarily addressed the deter-
rence aspects of treble damages. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Anti-
trust Defendants: Analysis, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 447 (1981); Comment, Contribution in Private Anti-
trust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682 (1978); Comment, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980); Comment, A Case Against Contribution in Antitrust, 58 TEx. L. REV.
961 (1980).
3. See, e.g., K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT. THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOM.
ics (1976); Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust
Strategy. 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353; Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a
Price Fixer Now and Then?. 68 GEo. L.J. 1131 (1980); Parker, Treble Damage Action-A Deterrent
to Antitrust Violations?. 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (1971); Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics
ofAntitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1980); authorities cited supra at note 2.
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discouraged may be procompetitive behavior. Such a result is not consis-
tent with the antitrust goal of promoting consumer welfare. 4 This is par-
ticularly true of actions brought by a distributor against a manufacturer
with whom the distributor had signed a restricted distribution contract. 5
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized the procom-
petitive aspects of some restricted distribution practices, 6 it is still possi-
ble for most of them to be attacked as unlawful restraints of trade under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 7 The analysis presented in this article ad-
dresses the narrow issue of the effects of potential treble damage actions
on the behavior of contractually-related manufacturers and distributors.
Part II of this article presents the notion of opportunistic behavior,
which has influenced much of the economic analysis and the Supreme
4. The Supreme Court, specifically the Burger Court, has adopted a pragmatic, efficiency ori-
ented antitrust policy which stresses the importance of maximizing consumer welfare. See Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp.. 442 U.S. 330. 343 (1979) (legislative history of the Sherman Act "suggest[s] that
Congress designed fit] . . . as a 'consumer welfare prescription' ") (quoting R. BORK. THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)): Continental T.V.. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 53 n.21
(1977) ("Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic advantages... but an
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks."). See
also Liebeler. Book Review, 66 CALIF L. REV. 1317, 1317 (1978) ("From an economic standpoint.
the goal of antitrust law is to balance allocative efficiency and productive efficiency in an attempt to
maximize the total wealth of society."): Easterbrook, Is There A Ratchet in Antitrust Law?. 60 TEX
L-Rtv 705 (1982).
For presentation of the view that antitrust laws should be concerned with more than consumer
welfare, see L. SULLIVAN. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 376 (1976) ("The antitrust laws do
not deal solely with problems of allocative efficiency.*'). and Redlich. Tire Burger Court and the Per
Se Rule. 44 ALB L. REV I (1979). Also, for an interpretation of Svlvania as not precluding an
antitrust doctrine based on non-economic goals, see Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical
Restraints: Integrating Social Goals. Ecotonic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REV 461 (1979).
For an analysis of the tradeoffs between efficiency and other societal goals, see Elzinga, The Goals
of Antttrust: Other Than Compehition and Efficienc'v. What Else Coutnts?, 125 U. PA L. REV 1191
(1977). Elzinga stresses that efficiency and equity are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals. but
he cautions against pursuing equity when they happen to diverge: "While it may seem tolerant, even
humanitarian, to call for more equity at the expense of efficiency, those who do so seldom are the
ones who suffer the loss in real wealth." Id. at 1213.
5. Restricted distribution practices are manufacturer-imposed restrictions on competition among
distributors or dealers who provide the manufacturer's goods to lower links in the production-distri-
bution chain or to the ultimate consumer. These contractual arrangements take many forms. A com-
mon dichotomy is between price and nonprice restraints. An example of a price restriction is a resale
price maintenance agreement between a manufacturer and its retailers that forbids the retailers from
selling the manufacturer's products below specified price levels. Nonprice restricted distribution
practices usually limit the freedom of retailers to sell the manufacturer's product outside a given area
(territorial restraint), from more than one specified outlet (location restraint), to a particular class of
customers (customer limitation), or to carry the products of other manufacturers (exclusive dealing).
See generallh Posner. The Next Step in tire Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution Practices:
Per Se Legalitv. 48 U. CHI L. REV 6(1981).
6. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7. Section I of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides in part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
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Court's recent treatment of vertical nonprice restraints. The transforma-
tion of the threat of opportunism into socially-wasteful expenditures of
resources is also discussed.
Part III examines the problematic role of opportunism in the distribu-
tion of goods, restricted distribution practices that aim to solve the prob-
lem, and the antitrust treatment of such restricted distribution practices.
This part argues that, in terms of controlling opportunism, which is the
substantive purpose of the practice, the Supreme Court's formalistic dis-
tinction between price and nonprice restraints is not useful.
Part IV examines the perverse incentives created by the current anti-
trust treatment of restricted distribution practices. Part IV begins with an
analysis of contract law damages and the incentives to engage in oppor-
tunistic behavior through inducing breach and collecting damages when
stipulated damage clauses provide for damages greater than actual dam-
ages. The analysis is then extended to the antitrust treatment of restricted
distribution contracts where the threat of a treble damage action is viewed
as an implicit government-mandated clause stipulating damages greater
than actual damages. Thus, the incentives to engage in opportunistic be-
havior through the manipulation of restricted distribution contract terms
are the same as under other contracts when stipulated damages are greater
than actual damages. This part argues that the pursuit of treble damages in
restricted distribution cases is another form of opportunistic behavior, and
that the threat of such opportunistic behavior increases the costs of pro-
competitive distribution practices and thus decreases consumer welfare.
The opportunistic pursuit of treble damages also explains why distributor
and franchisee terminations are among the most actively litigated catego-
ries of antitrust actions. 8
Part V discusses the policy implications of the analysis. Although it is
clear that the perverse incentives created by the current state of the anti-
trust law of restricted distribution practices could be eliminated by declar-
ing all such practices to be per se legal, the narrow scope of the analysis
does not support such a sweeping recommendation. Instead, Part V rec-
ommends that when the true basis of an action is a dispute concerning a
voluntary contract between vertically-related parties, the problem of the
opportunistic pursuit of treble damages should be minimized by adopting
a uniform rule of reason for all restricted distribution practices and by
revitalizing the in pari delicto defense to antitrust actions.
8. Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power,
53 TEx. L. REv. 1180, 1212 (1975).
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Ii. THE NATURE OF OPPORTUNISM
Reciprocal benefit is the basis of contractual interaction. Each party
agrees to the contract terms in anticipation of benefiting from the other's
performance. 9 The phenomenon of opportunistic behavior, or opportu-
nism, occurs when one party to the contract recognizes that the postcon-
tractual, preperformance manipulation of contract terms cannot always be
economically retaliated against. The opportunist then performs the con-
tract in a manner contrary to the other party's understanding of the terms,
but not necessarily contrary to the written or explicit terms of their con-
tract, in order to transfer wealth from the other party. 10 In other words,
under certain circumstances, an ex ante mutually beneficial contract may
be transformed into an ex post unilaterally beneficial contract through the
unbridled self-interested behavior of a contracting party. I I
Two examples illustrate the basic phenomenon of opportunistic behav-
ior. First, consider a plaintiff's attorney in a private antitrust action. The
plaintiff and the attorney have negotiated a contingency contract whereby
the attorney's fee will equal one-tenth of the total damage award in the
case. Suppose the attorney, who alone has become intimately involved in
the case and thus cannot be replaced on short notice, has presented a very
effective case so that prior to final arguments all observers agree that the
plaintiff will win the case and recover a substantial treble damage award.
However, immediately prior to final arguments, the attorney tells the
plaintiff he or she will intentionally lose the case unless the plaintiff
agrees to increase the attorney's fee to twenty-five percent. Putting aside
9. Of course, both contracting parties realize that future contingencies may cause one or the other
to regret having entered into an executory contract. These risks, however, can be minimized and
allocated through standard contractual rules or by customized individual agreement. See generally
Goetz & Scott. Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261,
1271-88 (1980) (legal rules of contract facilitate the efforts of bargaining parties to minimize and
allocate optimally the risks of future contingencies that may cause one or both parties to regret having
entered into an agreement); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensa-
tion Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM
L. REV 554, 554-77 (1977) (discussion of the economic justification underlying the risk-allocating
rules of contract).
10. See 0. WILLIAMSON. MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
(1975); Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "'Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM
ECON REV 356 (1980); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process. 21 J. L. & ECON. 97 (1978); Klein & Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL ECON 615 (1981); Muris, Oppor-
tunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981); Williamson, Transaction
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON 233 (1979); William-
son, Wachter & Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Ex-
change, 6 BELLJ. ECON 250 (1975).
II. Williamson has described opportunism as "self interest seeking with guile." Williamson,
supra note 10, at 234 n.3.
Vol. 59:27, 1983
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for a moment the ethical issues and the legal enforceability of the in-
crease, it is clear that the plaintiff must meet the attorney's opportunistic
demand or lose the case.
Second, suppose individual A owns a vacant lot and individual B is
contemplating building a house. It is conceivable that A and B could ne-
gotiate a contract for B to rent the lot and build his house. A and B could
contract for five years at the fair market value of the rent and also contract
for a series of five year options to extend the lease with the rent to be
negotiated. B, however, would not build on land rented for such a short
time (relative to the expected life of the house) for fear that after the first
five year contract expired, A would not agree to renew at the fair market
value of the land and would instead raise the rent to reflect the costs to B
of moving the house to another lot. That is, because of the threat of op-
portunistic behavior by A, B will most likely choose to avoid the poten-
tially mutually beneficial exchange. 12 This inability of the market to pro-
cess a mutually beneficial exchange is referred to as a transaction
failure. 13
The preceding examples illustrate two important general points about
the nature of opportunistic behavior. First, opportunism occurs after the
contract is formed and, therefore, is not a manifestation of precontractual
monopoly power. 14 This is an especially important point to remember
when discussing the relationship between opportunism and allegedly anti-
competitive restricted practices.' 5 Second, opportunism is a precon-
tractual problem in that the potential for its occurrence may lead to trans-
action failures. The mere possibility that opportunistic behavior will
occur after the creation of a contract is sufficient to alter the incentive
structures and behavior of potential offerors and offerees. 16
12. Another solution to this problem would be for B to purchase a lot he would like to build on.
Conceptually, this is a form of vertical integration, which is the solution emphasized in Klein, Craw-
ford & Alchian, supra note 10.
13. Transaction failures reflect the inability of the market to organize a mutually beneficial ex-
change because of the possibility of opportunistic behavior by one of the parties at the expense of the
other. See Williamson, Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 112 (1971). Transaction failures are also referred to as "market failures" or the "hold-up
problem." See Klein, supra note 10, and Caves, Vertical Restraints as Integration by Contract:
Evidence and Policy Implications, Discussion Paper No. 754, Harvard Institute of Economic Re-
search (1980) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review), for uses of alternative terminology to
describe the same phenomenon. Transaction failures, or market failures, are "failures only in the
limited sense that they involve transaction costs that can be attenuated by substituting internal organi-
zation for market exchange." Williamson, supra, at 114.
14. Muris, supra note 10, at523.
15. See infra the discussion of the relationship between opportunism and restricted distribution
practices at the text accompanying notes 21-34.
16. It is important to note that not everybody need be opportunistic in nature for a transaction or
market failure to occur: "It is not necessary that all agents be regarded as opportunistic in identical
Washington Law Review
The existing literature' 7 suggests five methods, other than merely
avoiding the transaction, by which potential victims of opportunistic be-
havior can eliminate or reduce their risk of becoming victims. First, it
may be possible to avoid the risk of opportunism through vertical integra-
tion. Conceptually, the use of in-house attorneys and the purchasing of
the lot on which one builds a home are forms of vertical integration. Sec-
ond, the potential victim may adjust the initial price to deter the occur-
rence of opportunism. For example, if the initial fee in the contingency
fee example had been twenty percent, then the attorney's opportunistic
threat would have been less credible because the attorney would have had
more to lose had he or she "thrown" the case. Third, future adverse mar-
ket adjustments may prevent a substantial portion of myopic opportu-
nism. Opportunism by the attorney may be deterred by the recognition
that the future value of his or her services would surely diminish as a
result of this opportunistic fee manipulation. Fourth, even if the potential
victim signs a relatively simple contract, he or she may rely for protection
on implicit contract terms based on legal principles which do not allow
the enforcement of certain types of postcontractual modifications. For ex-
ample, the attorney's opportunistic extortion may not be enforceable for
lack of consideration under a pre-existing duty theory. Finally, the parties
can agree to and write a complete, fully specified contingent contract and
rely on the courts to enforce the agreement. For example, the landowner
and the homeowner in the earlier example could specify the method for
determining future rent when the initial lease expires. These five methods
of avoiding opportunism will not act as a complete deterrence in all cir-
cumstances. They can, however, lead to substantial reductions in the risk
associated with many transactions.
Persons who recognize the existence of circumstances that might sub-
ject them to opportunistic behavior will invest resources in attempting to
avoid manipulation. On the other hand, persons who recognize the poten-
tial of acting opportunistically will invest real resources in perpetrating
opportunism. These joint expenditures of resources are socially wasteful.
That is, the resources are invested solely for the purposes of transferring
wealth, and are not devoted to any productive, or wealth-creating, pur-
pose.' 3
degree. It suffices that those who are less opportunistic than others are difficult to ascertain ex ante
and that. even among the less opportunistic. most have their price." Williamson. supra note 10. at
234 n.3.
17. See supra note 10.
18. An activity that results in an analogous waste of resources is theft. Theft involves more than
the transfer of wealth from one party to another: it also involves the investment of time and other
resources by thieves in the managing of the transfer as well as the investment of resources by poten-
tial victims in avoidance of the transfer. In the absence of theft, these resources would be invested in
Vol. 59:27, 1983
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The threat of opportunism, moreover, results in another social ineffici-
ency because it increases the transaction costs of exchange and thereby
reduces the volume of mutually beneficial exchanges. The net result of
the allocation of resources to purposes related to opportunism is a reduc-
tion in the wealth of society. The next part discusses the conventional
analysis of the effects of opportunism on contractual relationships be-
tween manufacturers and distributors.
III. OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION:
ECONOMICS AND LAW
Most large-scale manufacturers find it uneconomical to own the retail
outlets through which they market their products. There are two major
reasons for this. First, the nature of the manufacturer's product line may
be such that it cannot support a chain of outlets limited to a single product
line. The expense of owning and operating a chain of stores that sells only
the manufacturer's product (for example, baseball gloves) may well
overwhelm the potential revenue from the sale of the single product. Sec-
ond, the administrative diseconomies of a dispersed, nationwide system
of outlets could result in prohibitively high operating costs. 19 Thus, in an
attempt to get their products to consumers at the lowest possible cost,
many manufacturers of consumer goods distribute their products through
contractual agreements with independently owned distributors. 20 Such a
solution clearly has benefits, but it also has costs.
The particular cost of using independent distributors that is focused
upon in this article is that distributors may, under some circumstances,
act opportunistically to the detriment of the manufacturer. Consequently,
because their distributors' best interests may not always coincide with
their own best interests, manufacturers have developed contractual de-
vices to encourage dealers to act as if they were acting in the manufactur-
other, presumably productive uses. See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,
5 W. ECON. J. 224, 231 (1967) ("A successful bank robbery will inspire potential thieves to greater
efforts, lead to the installation of improved protective equipment in other banks, and perhaps result in
the hiring of additional policemen."); Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
19. The costs of these inefficiencies are reflected in a concern for controlling the behavior of self-
interested employees whose goals are not necessarily the maximization of the firm's profits. See
Williamson, supra note 10. A study of identical branch restaurants of a large chain, for example,
revealed that restaurants run by franchisee-owners were much more profitable than those run by hired
managers. Moreover, the study revealed that the profits almost always increased with a change from
hired managers to owner managers, and that they almost always decreased when the change was from
franchisee-owner to hired manager. See Shelton, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency": Comment,
57 AM. ECON. REv. 1252 (1967).
20. See INDUSTRY & TRADE ADMIN.. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE. FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY.
1977-1979(1979).
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ers' best interests. In this part, an example of the problems created by the
self-interested opportunistic behavior of distributors at the expense of
manufacturers is presented and analyzed. The analysis also includes dis-
cussions of manufacturers' contractual solutions to the opportunistic
problems and the antitrust treatment of those solutions.
A. Opportunistic Free-Riding and Transaction Failures
The potential that opportunistic behavior will disrupt a distribution sys-
tem is present whenever the consumer demand for the manufacturer's
product is positively related to the provision of point-of-sale and post-sale
services by the distributor. An automobile dealership is a good example
of a distributor that provides these types of services.21 The typical dealer-
ship provides an elaborate showroom, a trained sales force, large amounts
of local advertising, a substantial inventory, and a parts department. It is,
of course, costly for dealers to provide these services. An auto dealer
(dealer X) will incur these costs only if there is a reasonable expectation
that the costs will lead to a larger market share and higher profits.
The potential for opportunistic behavior on the part of dealers, how-
ever, might make the realization of a reasonable return on the investment
in services a risky proposition. Consider what would happen if another
dealer (dealer Y) of the same brand of automobile opened a dealership
across the street from dealer X. As a result, some of the benefits of X's
provisions of services would flow to Y, and X's expected return would
not be realized. In the extreme situation, Y would not provide any point-
of-sale or post-sale services, which would enable it to charge a lower
price because of its lower costs. The rational consumer would take advan-
tage of X's showroom services, then go across the street and purchase a
car from Y. Clearly, Y would be taking a "free ride" on X's provision of
services.
The transaction failure aspect of Y's intrabrand free-riding behavior is
straightforward. Opportunistic behavior by Y is individually rational, but
tends to cause an overall degeneration in the provision of services. Since
X does not capture the benefits of providing them, it will stop providing
services. Moreover, if X recognizes the potential for opportunistic free-
riding, it might not provide the services in the first place. This transaction
failure harms the manufacturer in that its profits are reduced because it is
unable to increase sales through the provision of point-of-sale services.
The manufacturer's response to the opportunism and conflict between its
21. This example is based on the facts of United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
(1966). See Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribu-
tion. Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions. 75 COLuo, L. REv 282, 285 (1975).
Vol. 59:27, 1983
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distributors is to place restrictions on the distributor's actions. The distri-
butors themselves might also seek the manufacturer's restrictions on their
actions in order to allow the distributors as a group to profit from the
provision of services .22
B. Resale Price Maintenance, Maximum Price Fixing and Market
Divisions
Economists have analyzed several contractual solutions to the prob-
lems caused by opportunism in distribution. 23 Resale price maintenance
and vertical market divisions are the most common of these problem-
solving contractual arrangements. The purpose of these agreements is the
suppression of intrabrand competition between dealers of the same manu-
facturer. 24
22. Because of the difficulty distributors would face in attempting to prevent the intrabrand free-
riding, they might find it worthwhile to pay the manufacturer to regulate their behavior. Similar
concepts related to free-riding, shirking, monitoring, and team production have played an important
role in recent developments in the economic theory of the firm. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972). Professor Cheung
gives the following example of the decision to hire regulators:
My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in China before the communist regime, when a
large group of workers marched along the shore towing a good-sized wooden boat. The unique
interest of this example is that the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip
them. The point here is that even if every puller were perfectly "honest," it would still be too
costly to measure the effort each has contributed to the movement of the boat, but to choose a
different measurement agreeable to all would be so difficult that the arbitration of an agent is
essential.
Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1,8 (1983).
23. The following discussion is limited to solutions to intrabrand free-riding in distribution. For
discussion of other types of opportunism in distribution, see Klein, supra note 10 (analysis of the
potential for opportunistic behavior by both franchisors and franchisees and how it affects contractual
terms); Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1982) (analysis of interbrand free-riding and
the protection of property rights in information through exclusive dealing).
24. The notion that the suppression of competitive market forces can increase economic effi-
ciency seems to be at odds with the maximum efficiency implications of the competitive model.
Moreover, the Supreme Court champions unconstrained competition:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political
and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally
laid down by the Act is competition.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
Suppression of competition among competitors, and the contractual or administrative devices used
to effect such suppression, can never be productive among independent producers of substitute
brands of a particular class of goods or services. Thus, all horizontal (interbrand) restraints are per se
illegal. See infra list of per se illegal practices at note 36. Yet the suppression of rivalry among the
distributors of the same brand of a good or service, when effected by the manufacturer, can be effi-
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Resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements, which prohibit distribu-
tors from selling the manufacturer's product below a specified price, are
contractually imposed by manufacturers in order to increase sales through
encouraging the provision of point-of-sale and post-sale services. 2 5 By
increasing dealers' profit margins, RPM agreements encourage dealers to
make investments in services in order to attract more customers and earn
even greater profits. 26 This, of course, increases the dealers' costs. How-
ever, as long as a minimum resale price is greater than a distributor's cost
of distribution, the distributor will have an incentive to increase its sales
by investing in the provision of value-enhancing point-of-sale services.
Distributors of the same brand of a product will continue to compete with
each other in the provision of services, but they will no longer compete
through price-cutting and free-riding on the provision of services. Since
the price is set by the manufacturer, the only way for a distributor to at-
tract more customers who value the service is to provide it.27
cient if its purpose is to reduce the prospect of opportunistic behavior. See Continental T.V.. Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 44-51): Liebeler.
lntrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1982). Williamson notes. "The
uncritical extension of competitive reasoning from the interfirm context to the manufacturer-distribu-
tor nexus is doubtlessly responsible for much of the confusion in the vertical restraints arena." Willi-
amson. Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Ap-
proach, 127 U. PA. L. REv 953.956 (1979).
25. The earliest contribution to this analysis was Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair
Trade". 3 J. L. & ECON 86 (1960).
26. For a graphical explanation of the effects of minimum price restraints on the provision of
services by dealers, see Posner. supra note 21, at 284-85. An intuitive feeling for the effects of this
type of restraint on the provision of point-of-sale services can be gathered from a consideration of the
provision of services in the airline industry prior to deregulation. Regulation of airline fares and
routes forced airlines to compete for customers through means other than cutting prices. The competi-
tion between the different brands of airlines took the form of differentiated customer services: for
example, advertising stressed the quality of meals and the amount of leg-room. The consumer wel-
fare implications of this type of activity are questionable because federal regulations imposed this
strategy on all competitors. When unregulated competitors are free to make their own decisions (that
is. to choose to compete through price cutting, provision of services, or some combination), con-
sumer welfare is unambiguously improved by the increase in options made available to consumers.
See infra note 27: Posner. supra note 21, at 285 n. 10:
The difference between the services induced by 1government sponsored] dealer cartelization and
those induced by the manufacturer's voluntary imposition of resale price maintenance is that in
the former case the services are provided beyond the point at which their value to the consumer
is just equal to their cost to the dealer.
27. There is little disagreement as to the nature of RPM and the restricted distribution practices.
This is due to the development of the so-called "New Economics" of antitrust law, which has helped
identify and narrow the issues relevant to policy discussions of vertical restraints. See Phillips.
Schwinn Rules and the "Nei' Economics" of Vertical Relations. 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 573 (1975). The
"New Economics" is the transaction cost approach, the basic tenets of which are stated in William-
son. The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations. 122 U. PA L. REV 1439.
1442-43 (1974). There remains, however, considerable disagreement as to the proper antitrust treat-
ment of vertical restrictions. Much of the disagreement can be traced to long-standing differences
between the "Harvard" and "'Chicago" schools of economics. Compare Posner. The Chicago
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Manufacturer-imposed market divisions, whether they take the form of
territorial, locational, or customer limitations, also reduce dealer or distri-
butor incentives to take opportunistic intrabrand free-rides. 28 Since each
dealer is granted a spatial monopoly of the manufacturer's product, the
dealer is a direct beneficiary of the increased sales that result from its
provision of services. Moreover, the dealer also suffers directly any
losses associated with its attempts to shirk or free-ride on the provision of
services. That is, if the dealer does not provide the services demanded by
the customers, then customers in the dealer's territory will choose com-
peting brands and the dealer's sales will decline.
The effectiveness of vertical market divisions in controlling opportun-
istic free-riding, however, can be threatened by price competition. For
example, a discounting distributor may be able to lower its prices to the
extent that customers from other distributors' territories may find it
worthwhile to travel to the discounters. Judicious spacing of territories by
the manufacturer may solve some of the problems associated with a
chronic discounter. 29 Of course, if the discounters can be identified, the
manufacturer can also solve the problem by refusing to sell to them.30 It
seems clear, however, that the nature of vertical market divisions is such
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979), with Nelson, Comments on a Paper by
Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1979). Sullivan, supra note 4, at 376 n. I notes:
In general, Harvard school theorists recognize ways in which restrictions imposed by a seller
on buyers for the seller's own purposes may adversely affect competition; by contrast, Chicago
school theorists regard such restraints as efficiency-producing, unless the buyers are the real
instigators of the restraint, in which case the arrangement is necessarily a horizontal cartel.
More specifically, some Harvard school commentators argue that the effect of intrabrand restraints
is anticompetitive because they encourage socially unproductive advertising and product differentia-
tion that insulates the manufacturer from competition. See, e.g., Comanor, Vertical Territorial and
Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1422-25 (1968);
Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Contin-
uing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REv. 275, 281 (1976). The Supreme Court,
however, rejected that view as "flawed by its necessary assumption that a large part of the promo-
tional efforts resulting from vertical restrictions will not convey socially desirable information about
product availability, price, quality, and services." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 56 n.25 (1977). On the other hand, the Court refused to accept the dealer services theory as
the complete explanation of nonprice restraints. Id. at 56 ("[T]he view that the manufacturer's inter-
est necessarily corresponds with that of the public is not universally shared .... ); id. at 58 ("[W]e
do not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se
prohibitions .... ").
28. See Posner, supra note 21, at 285; Liebeler, supra note 4, at 1326.
29. See Posner, supra note 5, at 11-12.
30. Depending upon the circumstances, however, such a refusal to deal may amount to an anti-
trust violation. See infra text accompanying notes 77-79. Another problem for manufacturers is that
discounters often receive their merchandise from authorized dealers' overstock instead of directly
from manufacturers. This practice is called trans-shipping. For a discussion of recent developments
in this area, see Discounters, Alleging Price Fixing, Are Fighting Cuts in Their Supplies, Wall St. J.,
June 21, 1983, at 37, col. 4.
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that the fine tuning of the provision of services available to manufacturers
through RPM is not available when vertical market divisions are used. 3 1
Another threat to the effectiveness of a vertical market division strategy
is the possibility that spatial dealers may charge prices so high that their
quantity sold falls below the manufacturer's profit maximizing quantity. 32
In order to prevent this type of opportunistic behavior, a manufacturer
may impose a maximum price on the dealer's sales. By moving the maxi-
mum price up or down, the manufacturer can control the provision of
services by its spatial monopoly dealers. 33
Each restricted distribution practice discussed above may be used by
itself or in conjunction with the others. That is, they are not mutually
exclusive. For example, the analysis indicates that RPM and market divi-
sion are substitutes in that they can be used to accomplish the same goals.
Moreover, the potential pricing difficulties associated with market divi-
sions serve to illustrate the interconnected nature of price and nonprice
restricted distribution practices. 34 In summary, it is apparent that a well
31. Posner, supra note 21, at 294 (Posner hypothesizes that RPM might be more efficient than
vertical market division because of the greater flexibility inherent in simply adjusting prices).
32. By making dealers compete with each other for the right to an exclusive territory, manufac-
turers can effectively protect themselves from this type of dealer exploitation. This "competition for
the field" has been proposed as a theoretical alternative to public utility regulation of natural mono-
polies. See Tullock, Entry Barriers in Politics, 55 AM. ECON REV. 458 (1965); Demsetz, Why Regu-
late Utilities?. I I J. L. & EcoN. 55 (1968) Crain & Ekelund. Chadwick and Demset: on Competition
and Regulation. 19 J. L. & EcoN 149 (1976). For judicial recognition of the concept of competition
for the market (or field), see United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
33. Easterbrook, Maxituin Pricing Fixing. 48 U. CH. L. REV 886, 890 (1981). This type of
line tuning also has implications for cartel theories of the emergence of vertical restraints. First.
maximum price fixing can be used to combat dealer cartels. See. e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons. Inc.. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Second, it has been argued that today's maximum
prices have a tendency to become tomorrow's manufacturer-cartel minimum price. See Albrecht v.
Herald Company. 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968). Thus, in terms of the cartel theories, the consumer
welfare implications of vertical maximum price fixing are mixed. For a thorough economic analysis
of vertical maximum price fixing, see Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer Welfare,
33 FLA L. Rrv 461 (1981).
34. The facts of In the Matter of Adolf Coors Company, 83 F.T.C. 32 (1973). illustrate the
interrelated aspects of restricted distribution practices. The case involved Coors beer, which is differ-
ent from other beers in that it is not pasteurized. Because of this, deterioration in quality begins
immediately after Coors is packaged. Quality, however, can be maintained through refrigeration and
rapid distribution. Thus, it is easy to see that Coors had some unique quality control problems in
distribution. For example, if a consumer purchased a six-pack of Coors that had spoiled, the con-
surner would not know whether to blame the manufacturer, the distributor, or the retailer; thus, the
consumer would rationally reduce consumption of Coors. Because of the lack of information about
the source of the inferior quality, individual distributors and retailers would have an incentive to cheat
on quality control costs and free-ride on the Coors' reputation for quality and freshness. The costs of
the inferior quality, which occasionally appeared as a result of this free-riding, would be bome by
Coors and all the other distributors who suffered from reduced consumption of Coors (that is. the free
riders, by definition, were not bearing the full costs of their actions). Coors needed to control these
opportunistic possibilities in order to compete effectively.
Coors could have maintained its quality from production to consumption by vertically integrating
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designed combination of RPM, maximum price setting, and market divi-
sion can be utilized by manufacturers to maintain strict control over po-
tential opportunistic intrabrand free-riding and thereby increase the inter-
brand competitiveness of the manufacturer's product line.
C. Antitrust Analysis
In the earliest restricted distribution case, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co.,35 the Supreme Court held that RPM is per se
illegal. 36 In the Dr. Miles case, a manufacturer of patent medicines sold
(through ownership) and performing the distribution and retailing functions itself. However, any con-
templation of the costs associated with trying to own all the retail outlets for a product such as beer
suggests the reasonableness of not organizing this aspect of beer production internally. Instead, Coors
chose a combination of contractual agreements (contract vertical integration), a more economical
substitute for ownership vertical integration, as a means of quality control. In order to discourage
free-riding by its wholesalers, Coors granted exclusive distributorships (a form of vertical market
division). Thereafter, any distributor who cheated on quality would be penalized by a reduction in
quantity sold in its territory. Since Coors would still have to bear some of the costs created by a
distributor who continued to shirk, Coors' distributors were also subject to termination on five-days
notice. Given the costs of bulding a refrigerated warehouse, the threat of termination would provide
distributors with a powerful incentive to comply. The quick termination clause when coupled with the
large transaction-specific investment by the distributor also opens the door to opportunistic behavior
by Coors. For an analysis of market force constraints on franchisors' behavior when they have the
ability to terminate at will, see Klein, supra note 10. By granting exclusive territories, however,
Coors created another potential problem-the distributors might charge a price too high for profit-
maximization by Coors. Therefore, Coors imposed maximum resale prices on its exclusive dealers.
Finally, to discourage free-riding and to encourage quality control measures at the retail level, Coors
imposed minimum resale prices on the retailers. The total effect of these restraints was to instill an
incentive structure that encouraged the provision of services in a manner very similar to the way
Coors would have provided them had Coors itself integrated directly into distribution. The preceed-
ing analysis of the Coors distribution system is from Liebeler, Bureau of Competition: Antitrust Ac-
tivities, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATIONS AND Bu-
REAUCRATIc BEHAVIOR 79-84 (1981).
35. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
36. Id. at 408.
A per se rule is simple to administer because it requires no analysis of effect or intent. The exis-
tence of the condemned practice establishes the violation: "[T]here are certain agreements or prac-
tices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Northern Pacific holding was reaffirmed in Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977). Practices currently categorized as per se illegal
include horizontal price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
vertical price fixing, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911);
horizontal division of markets (and other nonprice restraints), United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596 (1972); product-tying arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947); and boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S.
457 (1941).
The Rule of Reason, on the other hand, determines the legality of a restraint of trade only after
inquiry into the effect and the intent of the party who imposed the restraint. The classic statement of
Washington Law Review Vol. 59:27, 1983
its drugs through a standard contractual arrangement which, by its lan-
guage, created an agency agreement with the manufacturer's wholesalers
and retailers. The contracts included a consignment agreement that kept
title to the drugs in the manufacturer until the sales to consumers and also
set retail prices at which the product could be sold by dealers. In turning
aside the manufacturer's effort to enjoin breaches of its established retail
prices, the Supreme Court first found that the transactions were sales (not
truly agency or consignment arrangements) and then ruled that a manu-
facturer who sells its product to a wholesaler is not entitled to restrict its
resale through interference with the purchaser's pricing decisions:
"IT]hat these arrangements restrain trade is obvious." ' 37 Since the Dr.
Miles decision in 1911, the Court has opened and closed several excep-
tions to the per se rule against RPM, 38 yet Dr. Miles remains the leading
case.
39
the Rule of Reason was given by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231.238 (1918):
[Tihe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether
it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condi-
tion before and after the restraint was imposed: the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy. the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
For a more recent discussion of the Rule of Reason, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978).
37. 220U.S.at400.
38. Shortly after the Dr. Miles decision, the Court announced a broad exception to the per se rule
against RPM. In United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919), the Court upheld an
RPM arrangement whereby the manufacturer was entitled to terminate unilaterally a dealer who did
not adhere to the manufacturer's retail price. This exception has been all but foreclosed by the Su-
preme Court decision in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.. 362 U.S. 29 (1960), in which the
Court held that if the manufacturer does anything more than merely announce the suggested resale
price and then refuse to deal with distributors that fail to comply with that price, then the manufac-
turer is engaged in a per se unlawful RPM scheme. An additional exception was carved out of the Dr.
Miles holding when, in United States v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926), the Court adopted its
suggestion in the Dr. Miles decision. 220 U.S. at 404-05, that a vertical price restraint would be legal
if the manufacturer sold the goods directly to the consumers through agency and consignment agree-
ments. The Court approved an RPM scheme under which the retailer was the manufacturer's agent
and. instead of taking title to the products, received them on consignment. This exception was closed
in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), which involved the termination of a service station
dealer (Simpson) by a producer of gasoline (Union) when Simpson sold gasoline below the minimum
price set by Union. Union had probably organized its distribution system with consignment agree-
ments because of the Court's emphasis on the passage of title as indicated by the Dr. Miles and
General Electric cases. Yet, although it could not distinguish the General Electric agency-consign-
ment arrangement from the Simpson arrangement, id. at 25-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting), the Simpson
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The Supreme Court's treatment of nonprice restricted distribution prac-
Court invalidated the vertical price restraint on the ground that Union used it as a device to "coerce"
nominal agents-'"who are in reality small struggling competitors"--by taking away "the only
power they have to be wholly independent businessmen." Id. at 21.
39. Nevertheless, the Court has recently agreed to hear the appeal of a Seventh Circuit decision,
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
1249 (1983), which involves a manufacturer's termination of a distributor (Spray-Rite) that was al-
leged to have been the result of a conspiracy between the manufacturer (Monsanto) and some of its
distributors to fix the resale price of Monsanto herbicides. The case, therefore, should be classified as
a "mixed termination" case-a case where it is alleged tht the termination is the result of a conspir-
acy between distributors and the manufacturer. See, e.g., Piraino, Distributor Terminations Pursuant
to Conspiracies Among a Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 297 (1982). Compare "mixed termination" cases with "dual distribution" cases-
cases involving manufacturers who not only supply wholesalers but also sell their product directly to
retailers in competition with the wholesalers. For analyses of dual distribution, see Brett & Wallace,
Sylvania and the Dual Distribution Dilemma, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 971 (1981); Slowey, Dual
Distribution: Definition, Legislative Background and Specific Attempts at Regulation, 48 ANTrTRusT
L.J. 1799 (1980).
During the period prior to the termination of Spray-Rite, Monsanto sold its herbicides through a
system of distributors who were allocated areas of primary responsibility, but the vertical market
division was not exclusive and the territories of distributors often overlapped. 684 F.2d at 1232. The
overlapping may account for the fact that over the years Monsanto had received numerous complaints
from distributors about the excessive discounting of other distributors, including Spray-Rite. See
supra the discussion of the relationship between pricing and territorial restrictions at the text accom-
panying notes 29-30. Such complaints were the basis for Spray-Rite's allegations that it was termi-
nated as a result of a resale price fixing conspiracy between Monsanto and other distributors. Mon-
santo, however, had not received any complaints about Spray-Rite in the year preceding the
termination. Trial.Record 1379-1407, cited in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, On
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1259 (1983). Spray-Rite also alleged that Monsanto orchestrated a
post-termination boycott which prevented Spray-Rite from obtaining Monsanto herbicides from other
Monsanto distributors. Spray-Rite alleged, and the district court and the court of appeals agreed, that
Monsanto maintained the boycott through cash bonus payments to distributors who participated in
Monsanto's technical schools and demonstrations to dealers and customers. 684 F.2d at 1233,
1235-36. (The court of appeals based its boycott decision on Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) and United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).) The
cash payments, however, appear to have been designed to encourage distributors to provide services
and thus not free-ride on the services of other distributors.
Monsanto, on the other hand, claimed that it refused to renew Spray-Rite's distributorship pursuant
to Monsanto's criteria for evaluating distributor performance: "(1) whether the distributor's primary
activity was soliciting sales to herbicide dealers; (2) whether the distributor employed trained person-
nel capable of carrying out Monsanto's technical programs with dealers and farmers; and (3) whether
the distributor was fully exploiting the herbicide market in its area of primary responsibility." 684
F.2d at 1232 (footnote omitted). Spray-Rite fulfilled the first criterion in that 90% of its business was
devoted to herbicide sales, but 80% of those sales were another brand of herbicides, with only 16%
being Monsanto's. It appears that Spray-Rite was not fulfilling the second criterion, and, in any case,
it seems clear that Spray-Rite was not effectively promoting Monsanto's product vis-a-vis its compet-
itors. Id. at 1232. Monsanto's termination of Spray-Rite, in spite of the fact that Spray-Rite was the
tenth largest purchaser of Monsanto products, suggests that Monsanto felt that Spray-Rite was attract-
ing its Monsanto purchasers from other Monsanto distributors through discounting and free-riding.
Since Monsanto accounted for less than 20% of Spray-Rite's business, one would not expect the
termination to mean the end of Spray-Rite. In fact, subsequent to the termination, Spray-Rite contin-
ued to sell herbicides for four years. Id. at 1233. In 1972, however, Spray-Rite terminated opera-
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tices has oscillated from the Rule of Reason to per se illegality and back
to the Rule of Reason. 40 The current leading case for all types of vertical
tions, sued Monsanto, and alleged that the termination had eventually forced it out of business alto-
gether. At trial, the district court accepted an expert witness' testimony that the termination was the
cause of Spray-Rite's demise. On the basis of this testimony, the jury found that Spray-Rite had been
damaged in the amount of S3.500,000. Id. at 1240-42. The district court entered judgment in favor
of Spray-Rite and trebled the damages.
Monsanto appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held: (I) a per se illegal resale
price-fixing conspiracy can be inferred solely from evidence that Monsanto received complaints from
other distributors and subsequently refused to renew Spray-Rite's contract: and (2) nonprice vertical
restrictions, which are normally tested under the Sylvania Rule of Reason, are subject to the per se
rule merely because they are alleged to be part of a vertical price-fixing conspiracy.
The court of appeals did not use the Dr. Miles decision as the controlling precedent. but instead
relied on United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). In this regard, the court appears to have
been mistaken because Sealy involved horizontal, not vertical, restraints. Id. at 352. There was no
evidence in Spray-Rite that Spray-Rite was terminated as a result of collusion between Monsanto
distributors. The collusion, if there was any, was vertical, that is. between Monsanto and its distribu-
tors.
Therefore. the Supreme Court's decision to hear Monsanto's appeal presents an opportunity not
only for the reaffirmation or overruling of the 70-year-old Dr. Miles per se illegality rule. but also for
a coherent articulation of the relationship between price and nonprice vertical restraints. The latter is
especially important in view of recent changes in the antitrust treatment of nonprice restraints. See
infra text accompanying notes 40-48.
William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, must be credited with securing
the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Monsanto. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226
(t7th Cir. 1982). cert. granted. 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983). Baxter has indicated that the antitrust divi-
sion, in recognition that private actions represent many of the major Supreme Court antitrust deci-
sions. will continue to appear as amicus curiae in order to influence the precedents that shape the law.
See Baxter, Separation of Powers. Prosecutorial Discretion and the "Connion Law" Nature of Anti-
trust Law. 60 TEX L. REv 661. 700 (1982).
40. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). and Continental TV..
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). with United States v. Amold. Schwinn & Co.. 388
U.S. 365 (1967), The Supreme Court's oscillating treatment of these practices has been widely dis-
cussed. See, e.g.. R. BORK. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 188-97 (1978): R. POSNER. ANTITRUST LAW
147-67 (1976): Bern & Tansey. Proper Application of the Rule of Reason to Vertical Territorial
Restraints: Debunking the "lntrabrand-lnterbrand'" and "'Efficiencies' Deviations, 20 AM, Bus
L.J. 453 (1983): Bohling. A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social
Goals. Economic Analysis. and Sylvania. 64 IOwA L. REV 461 (1979): Bork. Vertical Restraints:
Schwinn Overruled. 1977 SuP CT REV 171: Butler & Baysinger. Vertical Restraints of Trade as
Contractual Integration: Antitrust Ranufications of a Syvnthesis of Relattonal Contracting Theory.
Transaction Cost Economics. and Organization Theors'. forthcoming in 33 EMORY L.J. (1984) (copy
on file with the Washington Law Review): Carstensen. Vertical Restraitts and the Schwinn Doctrine:
Rules for the Creation and Dissipation of Econontic Power. 26 CASE W. RES L. REv 771 (1976):
Flynn. Connentarv: Tite Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules ii Vertical Market Restraints. 58
WASiH U.L.Q. 767 (1980): Gerhart. The "Coipetitive Advantages" Explanation for Intrabrand Re-
straints: An Antitrust Analysis. 1981 DUKE L.J. 417: Goldberg. The Law and Economics of Vertical
Restrictions: A Relational Perspective. 58 TEX L. REv 91 (1979): Halligan, GTE Sylvania: The
Case for Overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co.. 39 OHIO ST L.J. 496 (1978): Liebeler. Intrabrand
"'Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV I (1982): Louis. Vertical Distribution Restraints
After Sylvania: A Postcript and Comment, 76 MicH L. REv 265 (1977): Louis. Vertical Distribu-
tional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argutnent for the Contitnuitg Use of a Partial Per
Se Approach. 75 Micii L. REV 275 (1976): Pitofsky. The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-
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market divisions is Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 41 which
involved a disgruntled retail dealer who did not adhere to the location
clause in his distribution contract. Continental T.V., the dealer, was one
of many independent dealers who distributed Sylvania televisions subject
to manufacturer-imposed location clauses. The problem that led to litiga-
tion began when Sylvania decided to add another dealer within a mile of
the outlet operated by Continental. Sylvania's action did not violate the
terms of its distribution contract and Sylvania ignored Continental's pro-
tests. Thereafter, the relationship between the parties deteriorated rapidly:
Continental started selling its Sylvania inventory at an unauthorized loca-
tion; Sylvania reduced Continental's credit line; Continental then refused
to make payments to the company that handled Sylvania's franchise fi-
nancing; and the finance company filed suit against Continental seeking
recovery of the money owed and the Sylvania televisions held in Conti-
nental's inventory. The antitrust action arose through counterclaims
brought by Continental alleging that the location restriction, and Syl-
vania's enforcement of it, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The district court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,42 found that Sylvania had violated the
antitrust laws and assessed damages. 43 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Schwinn decision and reversed in
favor of Sylvania. 44 The Supreme Court granted Continental's petition
for a writ of certiorari. In a remarkable display of candor, 45 the Court
adopted a Rule of Reason approach to such restraints, and ruled in favor
of Sylvania. 46 The Court's Rule of Reason analysis of the location clause
consisted of an analysis of the free-rider problem inherent in the distribu-
Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1978); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); Posner, The Rule
of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1977); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decision, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975); Strasser,
Vertical Territorial Restraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 775.
41. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Although the vertical restraint in Sylvania was a location clause, subse-
quent lower court decisions have interpreted it as applying to all nonprice vertical restraints. See,
e.g., Clairol, Inc. v. Boston Discount Center, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1123 (6th Cir. 1979) (dictum)
(Sylvania applies to all nonprice restraints).
42. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
43. See 433 U.S. at 40-41 (discussing district court holding).
44. 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), affd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
45. For a remarkable absence of candor in antitrust opinions, compare United States v. General
Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), with Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), discussed
supra at note 38.
46. 433 U.S. at 59 (affirming court of appeals decision in favor of Sylvania).
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tion of goods by independent dealers. 47 The Court recognized location
clauses as a solution to the free-riding-in-distribution problem and found
that the resulting reduction in intrabrand competition was offset by the
increase in interbrand competition. 48
The Supreme Court, in the leading cases of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Jo-
seph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.49 and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 50 has placed
vertical maximum price fixing in the same per se illegal category as RPM.
Since consumers do prefer lower prices to higher prices (assuming the
availability of the good or service), it appears that a contractual agree-
ment between a manufacturer and a retailer that establishes a maximum
price which the retailer cannot exceed would unambiguously increase
consumer welfare. Nevertheless, in declaring vertical maximum price fix-
ing per se illegal, the Court has chosen to value the "freedom of traders"
to set prices over the possible positive impact of such practices on con-
sumer welfare. 5 1 Moreover, although maximum price schemes are often
used as ancillary restraints in the operation of vertical market division
schemes, 52 which are subject to the Rule of Reason, the Court has refused
to treat vertical maximum price fixing differently from RPM because they
both involve price fixing. 53
The preceding review establishes that current antitrust doctrines apply
different standards to different types of restricted distribution practices
even though the practices are implemented as solutions to the same op-
portunistic phenomenon of intrabrand free-riding. The practices all have
the same substantive purpose. The Supreme Court recognizes the pro-
competitive aspects of some restraints, but treats others differently on the
basis of form. Thus, from these observations alone, there appears to be a
need for a consistent, coherent articulation of the antitrust relationship
between price and nonprice vertical restraints. The analysis presented in
47. Id. at 55-57.
48. ld. at 58.
49. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
50. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
51. See Easterbrook. supra note 33, at 888-89, for an analysis of these cases. He points out that
the Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.. 433 U.S. 36. 53 n.21 (1977).
rejected any antitrust doctrines that make the legality of practices hinge on the "autonomy of inde-
pendent businessmen." The Court has suggested that the Albrecht decision is open for reexamina-
tion. See Group Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210, 210 n.5 (1979)
(reserving judgment on the legality of an agreement to set maximum prices). See also Halligan, GTE
Sylvania: The Case for Overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 39 OHIo ST L. REv 496 (1978).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
53. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 168-70 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Since vertical
market divisions are lawful, it has been argued that maximum price fixing should be lawful as an
ancillary device to a lawful vertical market division. See Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg
Instruments, Inc.. 572 F.2d 883. 885-86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
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the next section suggests that this need is even greater than is generally
recognized.
IV. RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS, TREBLE
DAMAGES, AND INDUCED TERMINATIONS: ANATOMY
OF A POLICY FAILURE
Restricted distribution arrangements are contractual agreements be-
tween manufacturers and their wholesalers and retailers through which
the manufacturers control the distribution of their products. The contracts
usually provide for unilateral termination of the wholesalers or retailers
by the manufacturer should the wholesalers or retailers fail to abide by the
restricted distribution contract. The terminated parties often attack the
terms of the contracts as violative of the Sherman Act. In fact, distributor
and franchisee terminations, and other types of disputes between suppli-
ers and their dealers, are among the most actively litigated areas of anti-
trust.54 The analysis presented in this part suggests that the reason for the
proliferation of these cases is the perverse incentives generated by the
interaction of the treble damage action with the current antitrust treatment
of restricted distribution contracts.
A. Penalty Clauses, Opportunism, and Induced Breach
A recent contribution by Professors Clarkson, Miller, and Muris 55 pre-
sents an economic (or cost-benefit) analysis of the incentives to induce
breach when stipulated damage clauses provide for a potential damage
award greater than actual damages. Clarkson, Miller, and Muris begin
their analysis with an identification of the potential benefits of stipulated
damage clauses. 56 They conclude that stipulated damage clauses, which
54. See Bohling, supra note 8, at 1212.
55. Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 351.
56. Clarkson, Miller, and Muris identify six benefits of stipulated damage clauses. First, when
existing legal rules fail to provide adequate means of establishing damages from breach, stipulated
damage clauses allow parties to reduce the risk of not recovering damages in the event of nonperfor-
mance. The clear benefit here is that in the absence of the damage clause, some mutually beneficial
contracts may not occur. Second, parties may stipulate damages because the cost of proving damages
is very high. Third, where unfavorable postcontractual events may have differential impacts on the
ability of the contracting parties to perform, stipulated damages can be allocated in a manner which
reflects the relative ability of parties to avoid nonperformance. Fourth, stipulated damages allow
contracting parties with different preferences for risk to capitalize their preferences. For example, a
risk averse purchaser may be willing to pay a slightly higher contract price in return for a stipulated
damage clause that all but guarantees the supplier's performance. Fifth, similarly to the fourth bene-
fit, contracting parties can adjust price and stipulated damages to account for their different subjective
perceptions of the risk of nonperformance. Finally, stipulated damage clauses allow unknown parties
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are not utilized unless their private benefits are greater than the private
costs of negotiating them, enhance economic efficiency through the facil-
itation of mutually beneficial exchanges. 57 This leads the authors to
search for a logical explanation for the common law dichotomy of en-
forceable liquidated damage clauses and unenforceable penalty clauses. 58
Their inquiry leads them to consider some additional costs that might ac-
company stipulated damage clauses.
Clarkson, Miller, and Muris identify one additional cost of stipulated
damage clauses as the waste of resources devoted to inducing breach
when the stipulated damages are greater than potential actual damages. 59
In a subsequent article, Muris described the misallocation as follows:
Damage clauses stipulating an amount that exceeds the actual damages
create an incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior. With the inclusion
of such a clause, a promisee has more to gain from the promisor's breach
than from performance, giving the promisee an incentive to expend re-
sources in procuring a breach. These resources, plus those the promisor
spends to counter the promisee's efforts, are socially wasted. As with other
forms of opportunistic behavior, their only purpose is to transfer wealth.
Before the clause can be condemned as opportunistic, however, the.promi-
see must have an opportunity to induce the breach.60
This observation suggests that the efficiency of stipulated damage
clauses is not necessarily proven by their mere existence. Moreover,
Clarkson, Miller, and Muris show that the often misunderstood distinc-
tion between enforceable liquidated damage clauses and unenforceable
penalty clauses is actually based on an efficiency consideration of
whether the stipulated damage clause is so large as to create incentives for
opportunistic behavior in the form of induced breach. 6'
(for example. new entrants in an industry) to attract risk averse customers by, in effect, offering the
customers an insurance policy or performance bond. Of course, a single stipulated damage clause can
be adjusted so as to provide for any combination of the benefits above. Id. at 366-68.
57. Id. at 368.
58. Id. at 352-57 (discussing the current tests for distinguishing liquidated damages from penal-
ties).
59. Id. at 370-72.
60. Muris, supra note 10, at 581.
61. Some commentators object that the distinction betwen liquidated damages and penalties is
unwarranted. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM, L.
REV 554 (1977) (the distinction interferes with the enforcement of important groups of beneficial
stipulated damage clauses). Professors Kronman and (now Judge) Posner suggest that the Clarkson,
Miller, and Muris analysis is not really an efficiency analysis:
The refusal to enforce a penalty clause on this ground seems difficult to reconcile with effi-
ciency. If the inclusion of the clause would create a real danger of the promisee's trying to
provoke the promisor to breach, this danger will be reflected in the parties' negotiations over the
contract price or other terms of the contract. If the penalty clause survives the negotiating pro-
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The preceding analysis suggests that the incentives to engage in oppor-
tunistic behavior through court actions increase dramatically when the po-
tential damage award is greater than actual damages. Since section 4 of
the Clayton Act provides for damage awards greater than actual damages,
the Clarkson, Miller, and Muris analysis may provide some insights into
the incentive structures confronting contracting parties when one of the
parties is faced with a potential antitrust action.
B. Induced Termination: The Opportunistic Pursuit of Treble Damages
The typical scenario for private antitrust actions against restricted dis-
tribution practices involves a terminated distributor's allegation that the
manufacturer severed their relationship because the distributor did not ad-
here to explicit or implicit illegal contract terms, that is, it is often alleged
that the manufacturer enforces the illegal provisions through threat of ter-
mination. 62 Since most restricted distribution contracts are drafted in a
manner that precludes valid contract claims, antitrust law is often viewed
as a vehicle for recouping the losses (which are really unrealized gains
from trade) that result from the termination. 63 Moreover, the treble dam-
age and attorney's fees provisions of section 4 of the Clayton Act may
make the antitrust action more attractive to the aggrieved distributor than
a contract action.
The relationship between the incentives to engage in opportunistic liti-
gation through a contract action involving a penalty clause-where stipu-
lated damages are greater than actual damages-and through an antitrust
action-where potentially recoverable damages are triple actual dam-
cess, that is presumably because the benefits to the promisee exceed the costs to the promisor.
However costly a contract containing a penalty clause may be, all of the relevant costs are fully
borne by the contracting parties and therefore all will be taken into account in the negotiations.
Only if it is believed that the parties will fail to assess these costs correctly is there a basis for
intervention; the basis, however, is paternalism rather than efficiency.
However, Clarkson et al. argue that if the courts refuse to enforce penalty clauses where the
danger of induced breach is substantial, they save contracting parties the costs of having to
specify that their penalty clauses are not to be enforced where such a danger is present or to add
provisions designed to reduce the danger.
H. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CoNTAcr LAW 225 (1979). Their objection to the
conclusion of the Clarkson, Miller, and Muris analysis is well-taken, but it is not the purpose of this
article to resolve the issue. Both the Kronman & Posner and the Clarkson, Miller & Muris approaches
are in agreement as to the incentives to breach, which is the important matter from this article's
perspective.
62. A threat of termination for failure to comply with an illegal restriction is itself illegal. See
supra note 38 (discussing United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960)).
63. See Bohling, supra note 8, at 1181-82; Horton, Legal Remedies of a Distributor Terminated
Pursuant to a Contractual Provision of Termination Upon Notice, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 88 (1970);
Zeidman, The Rule of Reason in Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships, 47 At'rrmtusT L.J. 873, 897
(1979).
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ages-is straightforward. The fundamental and common characteristic of
the actions is that the basis of the dispute is a voluntary (and previously
mutually beneficial) contract. A fundamental distinction, however, con-
cerns the source of the excessive damage (that is, potential damage award
greater than actual damage) clause. The penalty clause is voluntarily in-
cluded in one mutually beneficial contract, while the threat of an antitrust
treble damage action is an implicit, government-mandated term in the
other mutually beneficial contract. Regardless of the source of the dam-
age clause, under either contractual agreement, the promisee-distributor
may have the incentive to induce breach or termination by the promisor-
manufacturer.
Distributors can induce their termination by cheating on the restricted
terms of the contract. For example, they can refuse to provide the agreed-
upon services or sell below the recommended price. The termination of
the contractual relationship is the manufacturer's means of retaliating
against a distributor's opportunistic free-riding. However, since termina-
tion is often viewed as evidence of anticompetitive behavior which sub-
jects the manufacturer to the antitrust laws, 64 the induced termination
may lead to a treble damage action. Thus, it is clear that both induced
breach and induced termination (which is usually a valid contractual re-
sponse to a breach by the distributor) represent the same type of opportun-
istic pursuit of excessive damages. 65
It is important to recognize that the opportunistic manipulation by a
promisee-distributor may not result in the termination of the distributor. 66
For example, because of the excessive damage clause, the promisor-man-
ufacturer may be wedged into a situation where the best outcome it can
realize is somewhere between the precontractual expected outcome and
the excessive damage award. If the distributor desires to maintain the re-
lationship after it has manipulated the terms in its favor, then it may be
possible to do so as long as the postcontractual manipulation stays within
a well defined range. 67 As long as the distributor's opportunistic behavior
costs the manufacturer less than the treble damage award, which the man-
ufacturer would have to pay if it terminated the distributor, then the man-
64. See supra note 62.
65. Manufacturers, of course, recognize the presence of the threat of opportunism and make
adjustments to it. The resulting market adjustments are discussed infra at text accompanying notes
84-89.
66. See Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective. 58
TtX L. REV 91.97-103 (1979) (discussing exit barriers).
67. The postcontractual bargaining range in the real estate example in the text supra accompany-
ing notes I1- 13 was determined in part by the cost of moving the house to another lot. For other
examples of the determination of bargaining ranges. see Klein, Crawford & Alchian. supra note 10.
at 298-99: and Muris. supra note 10, at 322-23.
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ufacturer may be forced into a situation where its distribution costs are
minimized by continuing the relationship with the distributor. 68 This
postcontractual manipulation of terms is the essence of opportunistic be-
havior.
C. "Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose" Protection for Distributors
The threat of opportunistic litigation has the clear potential for causing
transaction failures. However, it is important to remember that such a
transaction failure-deterrence to the use of restricted distribution prac-
tices-is precisely the result desired by those who think that the practices
are unambiguously anticompetitive. On the other hand, most scholarly
research suggests that it is impossible for vertical restrictions to have any
anticompetitive effect unless the manufacturer has substantial market
power.69 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized the procompeti-
tive role of nonprice restrictions in controlling opportunistic free-riding
behavior. 70
Even though in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.71 the
Court recognized the importance to consumer welfare of controlling op-
portunistic behavior in vertical relationships, the current state of the anti-
trust treatment of restricted distribution practice remains especially con-
ducive to opportunistic court actions. The dichotomy in legal treatment of
price and nonprice vertical restraints is a direct cause of the potential for
the most severe types of opportunism. Price and nonprice restricted distri-
bution practices can be utilized to accomplish almost identical goals, but
vertical nonprice restraints are subject to a Rule of Reason analysis
68. The analysis in the text is not complete. First, the reason the distributor does not exploit the
manufacturer to the point where the manufacturer is indifferent to termination or continuing the rela-
tionship must be explained. There are two potential answers to this problem. One is that the distribu-
tor may be able to earn a greater profit through continuing the relationship under the manipulated
terms than through capturing the treble damage award and therefore does not appropriate all the gains
from the relationship. The other explanation is that the distributor is constrained by fear that the
market value for its services will be diminished should it be identified as an opportunist. See supra
text accompanying note 17.
Second, the opportunistic behavior of one distributor also affects other distributors and, thus, the
manufacturer's entire distribution system. Consequently, the greater the disruption caused by an op-
portunistic distributor, the more likely the manufacturer will discipline it. Such strategic behavior
also plays a crucial role in many predatory pricing theories. See, e.g., Williamson, Predatory Pric-
ing:A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
69. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 708 ("No serious scholar believes today that resale
price maintenance or any other vertical restriction is harmful to competition in the absence of substan-
tial market power, and several believe that these practices are harmless even with market power.").
70. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-57 (1977); supra text
accompanying notes 47-48.
71. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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while vertical price restraints are illegal per se. 7 2 Consequently, a manu-
facturer using lawful nonprice restraints may be subject to opportunistic
manipulation should it ever discuss resale price with its distributors.
The problem is that a manufacturer and a distributor may come to-
gether for lawful purposes and, as a result of an innocent discussion of
general pricing policy, the manufacturer suddenly finds itself threatened
by an antitrust violation. Consider Judge Posner's description of the prob-
lem:
It is unrealistic to expect the manufacturer that uses location clauses and
outlet restrictions in order to limit free riding to be indifferent to the dealer
that circumvents the intent of the clauses by discounting. As soon as the
manufacturer's files contain any correspondence or memoranda document-
ing its concern, however, it has delivered powerful evidence of per se illegal
resale price maintenance into the hands of prospective plaintiff's lawyers.
Any effort, beyond mere exhortation, to terminate, penalize, threaten, or
even investigate the discounter may suffice to complete the plaintiff's case
under existing-which is to say expansive-interpretations of the meaning
of "agreement" under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Once a dealer is iden-
tified as a chronic discounter, he may even be able to violate lawful provi-
sions of the dealership agreement with impunity, because the enforcement
of any provisions against it may be deemed to have been motivated by its
discounting. The taint of price fixing may invalidate the entire system of
restricted distribution. 73
In other words, the harsh treatment of one type of vertical restraint opens
up the possibility of opportunistic manipulation of the provisions of law-
ful restraints.
The problem of opportunistic behavior in the form of antitrust suits
should not be blamed entirely on the differences in the legal treatment of
price and nonprice restraints. Even in the absence of a per se rule against
vertical price fixing, the distributor is often in a position to engage in
opportunistic legal action. Consider a distributor which voluntarily signs
a restricted contract with a manufacturer and assumes that the restricted
clause is subject to the Rule of Reason.7 4 If the arrangement proves profit-
72. See supra text accompanying notes 35-48.
73. Posner, supra note 5, at 12 (footnote omitted). Posner supports his analysis by reference to
two lower court cases (Cemuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979), and
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980)) where "the court indicated that nonprice
restrictions in distribution can constitute per se illegal price fixing if they are intended to limit dis-
counting." Posner, supra note 5, at 13. See also the discussion of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983), supra note 39.
74. The uncertainty of precedents under the Rule of Reason undoubtedly accounts for some of
the opportunism that is about to be described. A related, but not analogous, scenario, which hinges
on the uncertainties of litigation, is the so-called "new antitrust strategy":
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able for the distributor, then there are no problems. However, if the ar-
rangement does not fulfill the distributor's profit expectation, the distribu-
tor can violate the contractual terms in hopes of earning a larger return.
Should the manufacturer object to the distributor's breach of the contract
and terminate the distributor, 75 the distributor sues for treble damages.
That is, if the restraint is not successful, the opportunistic distributor has
the incentive to seek a larger return through breaching the contract and,
possibly, inducing termination. 76 The termination is viewed as an effort
to enforce an illegal conspiracy. This type of arrangement has been re-
ferred to as "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" protection of the distributor.77
D. Perverse Incentives
The distributor's position becomes especially enviable when it is real-
ized that the extra profits earned while cheating on the restricted distribu-
tion contract will be used in establishing the damages (lost expected prof-
its) that result from the termination. Since the increased profits resulting
from cheating may be eventually trebled in an antitrust action, the incen-
tive to cheat is even greater than suggested by the preceding analysis.
Professors Elzinga and Breit have identified an analogous situation in-
volving damages resulting from collusive behavior:
By "perverse incentives effect" we mean that a private party neglects to
modify his behavior when the damage done to him by the monopolistic firm
Under the "new" antitrust strategy, management intentionally exploits the private suit to
achieve noncompensatory objectives. Treble damage complaints are now filed in an attempt to
intimidate defendants into modifying their conduct in a way favorable to-the interests of the
plaintiff. The objective of the strategy is to cause the defendant to "soften" the vigor of its
competitive tactics. The plaintiff assumes that a risk-conscious defendant will acknowledge the
ambiguities of antitrust precedent, recognize the uncertainty of the outcome and, as a result, will
avoid taking the chance of exacerbating potential damages by continuing the alleged illegal con-
duct. Faced with this prospect, the defendant typically gives the plaintiff various "business ad-
vantages" (such as supply contracts) in lieu of a monetary settlement.
Austin, supra note 3, at 1353. This strategy differs from the opportunistic scenario of this article in
one crucial aspect: the basis of the initial relationship described by Austin is coercive, whereas the
basis of restricted distribution practices is voluntary. The scenarios are consistent in that they both
relate to intimidation through threat of antitrust action.
75. It might not be in the manufacturer's best interests to terminate the cheating distributor. See
supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
76. A similar scenario would involve a distributor entering into a restricted distribution contract
with a manufacturer because the contract with the restricted clause was better for the distributor than
no contract at all. After the contract is formed, the distributor may wish to avoid the restricted clause
while maintaining the distributorship relationship with the manufacturer. The distributor's lawyer
may suggest attacking the bargained-for clause as an antitrust violation. Distributors have success-
fully utilized this strategy. See, e.g., the discussion of Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts, Inc., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), infra at text accompanying notes 98-101.
77. Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1287, 1362 (1982).
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exceeds the cost to him of avoiding that damage or that the consumer modi-
fies his behavior in order to increase the damage done to him by the anti-
competitive activity. Unless a consumer bears the cost of purchasing from a
firm with market power, for instance, he has less motive to be a careful
shopper and seek out competitive substitutes. In other words, the incentive
to minimize his damages is weakened or disappears. He will not attempt to
alter his customary purchasing practices to avoid being overcharged because
he believes reparations will be forthcoming should he be found dealing with
an antitrust violator. Moreover, the possibility of receiving more than the
actual amount of damages magnifies the perverse incentives effect, since an
individual has an incentive not only to neglect seeking out substitutes or
finding ways of avoiding damages, but also even to suffer damages in order
to benefit from the collection of threefold the amount of damages actually
sustained. This incentive would exist whenever the expected value of the
reparations is greater than the amount of the damage. 78
There is a fundamental distinction between the behavior described by El-
zinga and Breit and the behavior described in this article. Elzinga and
Breit are describing the rational response of victims of collusive anticom-
petitive behavior. This article addresses the rational behavior of an oppor-
tunistic perpetrator of an antitrust violation where the true basis of the
treble damage action is a mutually beneficial contract to which the alleg-
edly-injured party had voluntarily agreed. The perverse incentives de-
scribed by Elzinga and Breit are also present in this article's scenario.
Another perverse incentive of the interaction of treble damage actions
with restricted distribution practices concerns their relationship to the
public policy underlying section 4 of the Clayton Act-the deterrence of
violations of the antitrust law. 79 Since under current antitrust doctrines it
is possible for a distributor to agree to a contract that includes a restricted
clause and then later bring suit seeking treble damages, 80 it seems reason-
able to suspect that some distributors enter into restricted agreements with
that escape strategy in mind. 81 That is, it is plausible that the current state
of the law not only encourages the suit but also encourages distributors to
seek contractual terms that amount to the violations. When the terms of
voluntary contracts can be used by one of the parties to the contract as
evidence of an antitrust violation, perverse results should not be unex-
pected. This observation helps explain why such cases dominate antitrust
litigation. 82
78. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT. supra note 3. at 84.
79. See supra note 2.
80. The scenario is not symmetrical. Manufacturers do not sue their distributors for antitrust
violations.
81. Consider the negotiating position of the distributor in the example. supra note 76.
82. Bohling. supra note 8. at 1212.
Vol. 59:27, 1983
Opportunistic Pursuit of Antitrust Treble Damages
The preceding analysis suggests that the Supreme Court's liberalization
of the antitrust treatment of nonprice restraints may not have resulted in
an actual expansion of alternatives available to manufacturers. This is so
because restricted distribution practices now subject to the Rule of Rea-
son may still be deterred by the threat of opportunistic court actions by
distributors who allege a violation of a related per se illegal practice. This
perverse result is as destructive to the efficient distribution of goods as
other types of transaction failures. 83 The fact that the judicially recog-
nized transaction failure (intrabrand free-riding) is the result of an imper-
fection in the market does not dictate that it should be of more concern to
policy makers than the opportunistic-court-action type of transaction fail-
ure that is the result of an inconsistent antitrust policy.
E. Market Adjustments to the Threat of Opportunistic Litigation
The potential for opportunistic treble damage actions by its distributors
is something a manufacturer must consider when establishing a distribu-
tion system. In other words, the potential costs (or risks) of an antitrust
action must be included in the cost-benefit calculations that underlie a
manufacturer's decisions about whether to utilize certain types of re-
straints.8 4 Unlike excessive stipulated damage clauses, which are negoti-
ated and may be left out of a contract, the potential treble damage action
is a government-mandated implicit term of all restricted distribution
agreements. 85 The antitrust penalty cannot be deleted by the contracting
parties and the threat of the penalty surely influences the negotiating pro-
cess and the terms of the restricted distribution contract.
The threat of postcontractual opportunistic behavior is socially waste-
ful because manufacturers try to avoid being victimized by investing re-
sources in precontractual searches for and investigations of potential dis-
tributors. Information about the reliability of .distributors is a scarce
commodity and, thus, is costly to obtain. 86 Because of their uncertainty
83. For example, see the problems associated with intrabrand free-riding, supra at text accompa-
nying notes 21-22, and interbrand free-riding, references cited supra note 23.
84. For an analysis of the risk allocating role of contracts, see authorities cited supra note 9.
85. The Kronman-Posner objection to the Clarkson, Miller, and Muris characterization of the
liquidated damages-penalty clause distinction as an efficiency-generating response is based on recog-
nition of the fact that stipulated damage clauses are the result of a voluntary contract. See supra note
61. The distinguishing feature of the treble damage clause is that it is not negotiable, and thus a
distinction between the problems of opportunism under the threatof treble damages and those when
the threat is absent may be justifiable on efficiency grounds.
86. See, e.g., G. STGLER, The Economics of Information, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
171 (1968). For interesting applications of the economic theory of information and uncertainty, see
Darby & Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. & ECON. 67 (1973);
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about the reliability of distributors, manufacturers would invest resources
in obtaining distributor-specific information even if the possibility of op-
portunistic court action were foreclosed. This is because distributors also
have the opportunity to engage in other types of opportunism in distribut-
ing the manufacturer's products. 87 The point is that the threat of oppor-
tunistic antitrust litigation leads manufacturers to invest even greater
amounts of their resources in preventing the opportunistic pursuit of tre-
ble damages by distributors.
Manufacturers' information-gathering processes, however, will gener-
ate a significant degree of market discipline over opportunistically-in-
clined distributors. A distributor, whose record of opportunism is discov-
ered by manufacturers, will find the demand for, and market value of, its
services diminished. The market consequences of opportunistic behavior
thus may deter distributor opportunism. Nevertheless, because of the in-
formation costs to the manufacturers of discovering the attributes of dis-
tributors, and the large potential payoffs to opportunistic dealers, 88 the
market adjustments will not reduce the occurrence of opportunistic litiga-
tion to a de minimis level. Moreover, in evaluating the effects of this
scenario on consumer welfare, it must be remembered that it is the mere
possibility of the occurrence of opportunism, not the actual occurrence of
opportunism, that leads to the socially wasteful investment of resources.
It is possible that in many situations manufacturers may rationally
avoid the use of efficiency-enhancing restricted practices in order to avoid
the threat of opportunistic court action. For example, if a manufacturer's
next best alternative to distribution through independent dealers con-
trolled by restricted distribution contracts is vertical ownership integra-
tion, then the manufacturer must compare the net benefits of the alterna-
tive distribution schemes. If the threat of opportunistic antitrust actions
swings the balance from a restricted distribution system to vertical inte-
gration, then the manufacturer will choose vertical integration. Such a
result warrants two comments. First, since vertical integration is the sec-
ond best alternative, it is clear that the antitrust policy has caused an inef-
ficient allocation of resources. Second, the vertical integration alternative
will have an impact on the transfer-payment terms of restricted distribu-
tion contracts. That is, all distributors will bear a portion of the manufac-
turer's costs associated with bearing the risks of opportunistic behavior by
and Schwartz & Wilde. Intervening in Markets on the Basis of lmperfect Information: A Legal and
Econonic Analysis. 127 U. PA L. REv 630 (1979). See also infra note 89.
87. See supra Part IliA.
88. Treble damage awards in restricted distribution cases are nontrivial. See. e.g.. Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.. 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982). cert. granted. 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983).
discussed supra note 39 (actual damages of $3.5 million, trebled to $10.5 million).
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a few distributors since the risk of opportunism lowers the value of their
services and there exist alternatives to their services. Thus the possibility
of opportunistic behavior by some distributor not only injures manufac-
turers, but also injures all distributors regardless of whether or not they
are inclined to act opportunistically. 89 Distributors as well as manufactur-
ers stand to gain from a change in policy.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the costs of the private en-
forcement system greatly outweigh any positive effects which might flow
from the deterrence of restricted distribution practices. The costs are di-
rectly attributed to the internal inconsistency of an antitrust policy that
allows certain types of restraints because of their efficiency-enhancing
possibilities but also allows for treble damage actions against the perpe-
trators when there is the slightest hint of the use of a per se illegal practice
that naturally accompanies the lawful practice. One straightforward solu-
tion to this policy failure would be to declare all restricted distribution
practices to be per se illegal. However, adoption of such a policy would
not be consistent with the consumer welfare standard. Another straight-
forward solution would be to declare all restricted distribution practices to
be per se legal. 90 Although consistent with the general presumption that
restricted distribution practices are procompetitive, such a sweeping pol-
icy recommendation is not justified by the narrow scope of the precedifig
analysis. Accordingly, this part presents two policy recommendations
aimed at solving the specific problem identified.
A. Uniform Treatment of Price and Nonprice Restrictions
The formalistic distinction between price and nonprice restricted distri-
bution practices is not only unjustifiable in terms of economics, it is also a
major culprit in the facilitation of court-enforced postcontractual manipu-
lation. The complementary uses of price and nonprice restrictions make it
89. The analysis presented is suggested by the economic theory of adverse selection which
states, in its most basic form, that the costs arising because of uncertainty with respect to the quality
of a certain category of goods will be borne by the higher quality goods in the category. For example,
uncertainty with respect to quality in the used car market lowers the demand price of high quality
cars. Original investigations of this principle are described in Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare
Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcON. REv. 141 (1963); and Akerlof, The Market for "Lem-
ons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
90. See Posner, supra note 5 (giving other theoretical and practical reasons for declaring all
restricted distribution practices per se legal). See also Liebeler, supra note 24 (making theoretical and
practical arguments for removing all intrabrand or intrafirm practices from antitrust scrutiny).
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important to subject both types of restraints to the same standards of le-
gality. 9' Since most economists accept the procompetitive analysis of re-
stricted distribution practices, the equalization of the antitrust treatment
should be achieved through a liberalization of the rules governing vertical
price fixing. Thus, vertical price restraints should not be per se illegal.
The removal of vertical price restrictions from the per se illegality cate-
gory and adoption of a uniform Rule of Reason for all restricted distribu-
tion practices would serve to reduce the plaintiff-distributor's probability
of establishing an antitrust violation and thereby reduce the distributor's
ability to manipulate opportunistically the terms of the clearly lawful as-
pects of the vertical relationship. The major impact of such a move would
be the lessening of the degree of risk associated with using nonprice dis-
tribution restrictions, which the Supreme Court has conceded may have
procompetitive effects. 92 The threat of opportunistic antitrust actions
based on vertical price fixing theories has surely served to clog the com-
munication lines between manufacturers and their territorial distribu-
tors. 93 The removal of this threat would allow for the utilization of verti-
cal restraints to their full efficiency-enhancing potential because
manufacturers could balance the costs and benefits of the strategy without
having to worry about inadvertently slipping into a per se illegal practice.
B. The In Pari Delicto Defense
Uniform treatment of complementary or substitute vertical restrictions
may solve some of the problems associated with induced terminations and
treble damage actions. It will not, however, eliminate the use of real re-
sources to prevent or to facilitate the occurrence of opportunistic behav-
ior.94 As long as any vertical restricted practice is potentially illegal under
a Rule of Reason analysis, opportunistic behavior through court action by
a distributor will be a possibility that must be accounted for by manufac-
91. The facts of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983), as discussed supra note 39, illustrate the interactive, complemen-
tary nature of price and nonprice restricted practices. The Spray-Rite case thus provides an excellent
forum for the Supreme Court to declare a uniform Rule of Reason.
92. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-57 (1977) (acknowledg-
ing procompetitive aspects of nonprice distribution restrictions); and supra text accompanying notes
47-48.
93. The free flow of information between a manufacturer and its distributors is a necessary condi-
tion for the operation of an efficient distribution system. See P. AREEDA. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 388
(2d ed. 1974).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. The fundamental problem is the inability of the
Supreme Court to develop a coherent Rule of Reason for vertical restrictions, and the risk that pro-
competitive (or neutral) practices will be declared anticompetitive and illegal. The implicit assump-
tion of the discussion in the text is that vertical restraints should be presumed procompetitive. See
supra note 69.
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turers. The most straightforward solution to this problem, as mentioned
earlier, would be for the Supreme Court to declare all restricted distribu-
tion practices per se legal. However, it would be unrealistic to expect the
Court to take such a step. On the other hand, an intermediate change in
policy through the revitalization of the in pari delicto defense would solve
the problems of opportunistic treble damage actions.
The in pari delicto defense, 95 which represents a moral judgment that a
party should not be allowed to gain from the party's own misconduct, is a
common law doctrine that is applied to illegal executory contracts. Where
the duties of the parties to the illegal executory contract have been at least
partially fulfilled and one party sues for damages or continued perfor-
mance, the court will bar the suit if the defendant establishes that the
plaintiff is in pari delicto. In other words, if the plaintiff is also to blame
for the formation of the illegal contract, which is clearly the case if the
contract is voluntary, 96 then recovery will be barred. The in pari delicto
defense is similar to the illegality defense. Where an executory contract
has not been executed, illegality is a complete defense to a suit seeking
damages or performance. The courts will not enforce the illegal bargain.
If the contract has been executed, the illegality defense is called in pari
delicto.
The application of in pari delicto to antitrust treble damage actions in-
volving restrictions on distribution, while analogous in terms of sub-
stance, is not as straightforward as in strict contract law. Although an
illegal contract is the true basis of the action under both antitrust and con-
tract theories, there is a potential difficulty in that the plaintiff in the anti-
trust action is the party who actually breached the restricted distribution
contract. Since the plaintiff in the antitrust action was terminated by the
manufacturer for violating some provision of the restricted distribution
contract, the antitrust suit is not a contract action. 97 However, once it is
95. For discussion of the in pari delicto defense, see Handler, supra note 77, at 1359 (1982). See
also SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 785.
96. All contracts are voluntary. Asserting that the bargaining power of the manufacturer resulted
in the distributor being forced to accept onerous terms, see infra text accompanying notes 99-102,
misses the essential point that other terms in the contract compensate the distributor for accepting the
"onerous" terms. Moreover, the use of antitrust laws to strike onerous terms from a contract, see
supra note 76, destroys the delicate equilibrium generated by the bargaining process and results in
uncompensated transfers to distributors from manufacturers.
97. There is some evidence that the statutory right to recover damages is based on a tort theory.
Senator Teller suggested a tort basis under the Sherman Act damage remedy when he described the
Act as an attempt "to abate ... a sort of public nuisance." 21 CONG. REc. 2612 (1890). Courts also
have treated Section 4 as a kind of tort remedy. See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parch-
ment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,563 (1931); Soloman v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389,
392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 331 ("For purposes
of remedy, a private treble damages action under the federal antitrust laws is a tort action.',') The
contributory negligence defense in tort law is analogous to the in pai delecto defense in contract law.
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realized that the in pari delicto defense is available to the distributor in the
guise of an antitrust counterclaim or affirmative defense if the manufac-
turer sues for damages or performance of the illegal restricted contract
(rather than merely terminating the relationship), then it seems that a
symmetrical utilization of the in pari delicto defense should be available
to the manufacturer-defendant in antitrust actions.
The leading case on the use of the in pari delicto defense in antitrust
treble damage actions is Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp.98 In Perma Life Mufflers, a group of franchise dealers had accepted
contracts to sell Midas mufflers and had contracted to sell the mufflers at
prices set by the franchisor and to not deal with any Midas competitors.
Of these restrictive terms, the Supreme Court noted: "Petitioners [the
dealersI apparently accepted many of these restraints solely because their
acquiescence was necessary to obtain an otherwise attractive business op-
portunity." 99 The opportunistic franchisee dealers, who wished to take
the benefits of their bargains without the burdens, alleged that Midas, its
parent International Parts, and two other subsidiaries unlawfully con-
spired to restrain competition under section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 3 of the Clayton Act and had forced them to accept the onerous
terms of the franchise agreements.
The Supreme Court apparently viewed the dealers as victims of a supe-
rior economic force that had bound them to unfair and ill-advised bar-
gains. The oppressed dealers, according to the Supreme Court, were enti-
tled to relief under the antitrust laws which, in effect, allow the federal
courts to rewrite their contracts for them. Of the in pari delicto defense,
the Court held, in effect, that the role of private attorneys general in en-
forcing the antitrust laws was more important than denying recovery to a
plaintiff who is "no less morally reprehensible than the defendant."1 0 0
Thus, under current antitrust doctrine, court-enforced postcontractual op-
98. 392 U.S. 134(1968).
99. Id. at 139.
100. Id. The Court emphasized the deterrence effects of the private action:
ITIhe purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an
ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust
laws. The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensive
than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding policy in favor of
competition.
Id The Court ignores the costs to society when real resources are devoted to private enforcement of
antitrust laws This use of resources becomes very important when the proscribed practice also has
potential procompetitive features. That is, if the proscribed practice has only a small anticompetitive
effect. then the resources devoted to enforcement of the law may lead to an overall reduction in
wealth. In this regard, per se illegal or per se legal rules may both be preferable to the Rule of
Reason. This is so because the more precise the law. the less likely the suit will be tried. See. e.g..
Ehrlich & Posner. An EconomticAnalvsis of Legal Rilemaking. 3 J. LEGAL STUD 257. 271 (19741.
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portunistic behavior in the form of the private suit for treble damages is
alive and well. 10I
The rejection of in pari delicto as an antitrust defense has not only dis-
torted the relative bargaining powers of distributors and manufacturers to
the point where some manufacturers may not utilize otherwise efficient
restricted practices, it may also account for the large amount of private
antitrust litigation that has dominated the antitrust caseload. 102 A proper
utilization of the in pari delicto defense would have many of the same
beneficial effects as establishing a uniform Rule of Reason. Moreover, it
would elminate the threat of opportunistic treble damage actions in all
antitrust cases where the true basis of the action is a voluntary contract.
This recommendation is consistent with Professor Handler's sugges-
tion that a reasonable balancing approach would be to allow the in pari
delicto defense in instances of equal fault but not allow it to "preclude
suits for injunctive relief against the defendant's continued wrong doing
where the plaintiff has voluntarily ceased to participate in the challenged
agreement."1 03 Since government attacks on these practices would still
be available, the reduction in private enforcement actions would not inter-
fere with the public policy goals of the antitrust laws. 104 Also, under the
approach advocated here, unfairly treated franchisees and distributors
would, of course, still be allowed to pursue private contract remedies. 105
101. Consider Professor Handler's discussion of the relationship between contracting parties and
treble damages:
An effort to reconcile the competing policies of the antitrust laws and the in pari delicto doc-
trine is long overdue. The rejection of in pari delicto as a defense subverts the very goals of the
antitrust laws. Justice Black's formulation, if applied literally, would require a court to grant a
plaintiff treble damages where both parties are equal participants in an unlawful scheme without
even compelling plaintiff to cease the very illegality of which he is complaining .... Moreover,
Justice Black also encouraged illegal conduct by plaintiff, by offering a "heads-I-win, tails-you-
lose" protection if plaintiff violated the antitrust laws-if the conspiracy is successful, plaintiff
profits from the illegality; if it is unsuccessful, it sues for treble damages. The policies of the
antitrust laws and the in pari delicto doctrines are thus not entirely inconsistent.
Handler, supra note 77, at 1362.
102. See Bohling, supra note 8.
103. Handler, supra note 77, at 1363. This situation differs from the situation discussed supra
note 97.
104. Professor Austin, after identifying the perverse incentives of the so-called "new antitrust
strategy," suggests that "serious consideration should be given to turning over to the government
exclusive responsibility for enforcing the antitrust laws." Austin, supra note 3, at 1372. This article
does not advocate such a sweeping recommendation for three reasons. First, the analysis in this arti-
cle does not justify such an approach. Second, adoption of a uniform Rule of Reason and the utiliza-
tion of the in pari delicto defense can be accomplished through court action, while Austin's recom-
mendation would surely require legislative action. Finally, it is not clear how the government would
select which cases to prosecute. See, e.g., Faith, Leavens & Tollison, Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J. L.
& ECON. 329 (1982).
105. Goldberg, supra note 66, at 127-29, also suggests that antitrust law is not necessary to
protect franchisees and distributors. However, he feels that contract law has not yet evolved to the
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Finally, the in pari delicto defense would surely allow for a more produc-
tive utilization of the resources that are currently devoted to the opportun-
istic pursuit of treble damages. The net result would be an increase in
consumer welfare.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This article has examined the economic incentives generated by the in-
teraction of the current state of the antitrust law of restricted distribution
practices with the treble damage award. It identified the incentives and
ability of distributors to breach voluntary restricted distribution contracts
by cheating on the restrictive terms of the contract, thereby inducing their
own termination by the manufacturer. Since the termination is often
viewed as evidence of an unlawful restraint of trade, distributors have
incentives to pursue treble damages through inducing the termination.
This observation goes a long way towards explaining why distributor ter-
minations have been among the most actively litigated areas of antitrust.
The main point of the article, however, is that the threat of such opportun-
istic postcontractual pursuit of treble damages by distributors reduces
manufacturers' incentives to implement procompetitive distribution strat-
egies. That is, the ex ante incentives generated by the threat of postcon-
tractual manipulation results in inefficiencies as reflected in higher costs
of negotiating and managing the distribution of goods and services.
Moreover, the analysis of the threat of treble damage actions suggests that
the recent liberalization of the law of restricted distribution practices will
have little procompetitive impact.
The article suggests that this policy failure can be remedied through the
adoption of two specific recommendations. First, the Supreme Court
should adopt a uniform antitrust treatment for all restricted distribution
practices. Second, the in pari delecto defense should be available to anti-
trust defendants. The second recommendation would clearly solve the
policy failure, but the first recommendation, which would lessen the ex-
tent of the problem, appears to be closer to realization because the Su-
preme Court currently has a restricted distribution case scheduled for ar-
gument. The policy failure identified in this article should ultimately be
viewed as another theoretical justification for declaring all restricted dis-
tribution practices per se legal.
point where it can successfully resolve disputes between distributors and manufacturers or between
franchisors and franchisees without simply dissolving the contract and awarding damages. He sug-
gests that treble damages should not be awarded in disputes of that nature.
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